See Drivechain for an introduction. Here we’ll just have a list of reasons why miners would not steal:
- they will lose future fees from that specific drivechain: you can discount all future fees and condense them into a single present number in order to do some mathematical calculation.
- they may lose future fees from all other Drivechains, if the users assume they will steal from those too.
Bitcoin will be devalued if they steal, because:
- Bitcoin is worth more if it has Drivechains working, because it is more useful, has more use-cases, more users. Without Drivechains it necessarily has to be worth less.
- Bitcoin has more fee revenue if has Drivechains working, which means it has a bigger chance of surviving going forward and being more censorship-resistant and resistant to State attacks, therefore it has to worth more if Drivechains work and less if they don’t.
Bitcoin is worth more if the public perception is that Bitcoin miners are friendly and doing their work peacefully instead of being a band of revolted peons that are constantly threating to use their 75% hashrate to do evil things such as:
- double-spending attacks;
- censoring of transactions for a certain group of people;
- selfish mining.
if Bitcoin is devalued its price is bound to fall, meaning that miners will lose on
- their future mining rewards;
- their ASIC investiment;
- the same coins they are trying to steal from the drivechain.
- if a mining pool tries to steal, they will risk losing their individual miners to other pools that don’t.
- whenever a steal attempt begins, the coins in the drivechain will lose value (if the steal attempt is credible their price will drop quite substantially), which means that if a coalition of miners really try to steal, there is an incentive for another coalition of miners to buy some devalued coins and then stop the steal.